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Sub Specie Aeternitatis
An Actualization of Wittgenstein on Ethics and Aesthetics
Somogy Varga
abstract  This article will present an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s under­
standing of the relationship between ethics and aesthetics. In extension, it 
will inform recent discussions regarding a special kind of nonsensicality, which 
forms a central part of ethical and aesthetical expressions. Instead of identity 
between ethics and aesthetics, we should understand the relationship in terms 
of interdependence. Both attitudes provide a view sub specie aeternitatis and thus 
permit a view of the world as a whole. Employing the vocabulary of Charles 
Taylor and Harry Frankfurt, it must be remembered that rather than a neutral 
view from nowhere, such wholeness arises out of strong evaluations that are 
made against the backdrop of a constitutive framework of intelligibility. At 
this point, the epistemic gain of actualizing Wittgenstein will reveal itself: 
it will put us in a position where it is possible to differentiate between ethi­
cal and aesthetical forms of identification that Taylor and Frankfurt neglect. 
However, in order to actualize Wittgenstein’s ideas, it is necessary to argue 
that Tractatus should not be understood in a Kantian fashion as suggested by 
Tilghman for instance. 
keywords  Wittgenstein, sub specie aeternitatis, ethics, aesthetics, identifi­
cation
In his famous sentence, “Ethics and Aesthetics are one and the same,”1 
Wittgenstein emphasizes the intrinsic connection between two fields of 
study, to which he was particularly devoted. He points to his profound 
fascination of aesthetical questions: “I may find scientific questions in-
teresting, but they never really grip me. Only conceptual and aesthetical 
questions do that.”2 On the other hand, although the reception of his 
early work was regarded as a foundation for logical positivism,3 Wittgen-
stein has given ethics as a central theme of the treatise in diary record-
ings and letters written parallel to the treatise.4 In a letter to the editor of 
Der Brenner, Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein notes: 
My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not 
written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book 
draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am 
convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits.5 
Other sources, such as Paul Engelmann, confirm that Wittgenstein em-
phasized the ethical dimension of his book and considered this its fun-
damental point.6 The notion of sub specie aeternitatis is central to under-
standing his struggle to identify something he could classify as ethically 
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good. In Tractatus he says, “[t]o view the world sub specie aeternitatis 
is to view it as a whole – a limited whole.”7 In a later remark from the 
Notebooks dealing with this subject, Wittgenstein emphasizes the ethical 
importance: “… the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis.”8 
In Tractatus, ethics and aesthetics – these two apparently central con-
cerns in Wittgenstein’s thought – are brought together in a rather short 
bracketed remark: 
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. 
Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and Aesthetics are one and the same.)9
Even though Wittgenstein emphasized aesthetics and ethics, it seems 
that his thoughts on these subjects received comparatively modest at-
tention in subsequent Wittgenstein research. To a certain degree this has 
to do with the fact that Wittgenstein’s remarks about this subject are ex-
ceedingly brief, fragmented and sometimes enigmatic. This also makes 
any attempt at extracting a theory of aesthetics or ethics from these spor-
adic remarks rather challenging and perhaps even problematic. Addi-
tionally, the assumption of a faultless unified aesthetics or ethics seems 
problematic and in many ways outdated; so why the inconvenience of 
engaging in this problematic subject? The motivation for working with 
these considerations lies in the potential for informing more recent dis-
cussions. This is why the aim of this article will be to shed light on his 
views regarding the unity of ethics and aesthetics and to clarify the role 
of aesthetics in an ethical orientation. 
In the initial presentation I will examine the possibility of talking 
about ethics and aesthetics within Tractatus; and proceed by elucidating 
the posited oneness of ethics, aesthetics and the common perspective of 
the whole (sub specie aeternitatis) that this provides us with (I).10 Rather 
than emphasizing oneness, I will elaborate on internal differences of per-
spectives in the second part, which makes clear the relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics and the ethical role of aesthetics (II). In conclusion, 
I will spell out the genuine merits and the actuality of Wittgenstein’s ac-
count. I will attempt to show that Wittgenstein’s account does not inscribe 
itself in the Kantian or Nietzschean discourse, but establishes a middle 
path between these two views (III). 
The elucidation of this matter will entail going beyond the limits of 
Tractatus and take into consideration additional sources such as the 
Notebooks (1914–1916) and the more long-winded thoughts from ‘Lecture 
on Aesthetics’, ‘Lecture on Ethics’ and On Certainty.11
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I. The importance of nonsense 
At first sight it may seem somewhat odd to discuss these subjects, es-
pecially with the opening remarks of the Tractatus in mind. Wittgen-
stein states that the whole argument of the book could be summed up 
as follows: “What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one 
cannot speak thereof one must be silent.”12 Since ethical and aesthetical 
statements are not logically connected to facts in the world they clearly 
belong to these spheres of silence. So how can Wittgenstein emphasize 
the ethical impetus of his work? After all, as Russell notes, “Mr Wittgen-
stein manages to say a good deal about what cannot be said.”13 What sense 
does it make to clarify their relationship when they exceed the limits of 
propositional language such that nothing can be said about them? 
There is a tradition for what one could call the therapeutic interpreta-
tion of what Wittgenstein calls nonsense. There is the resolute way of do-
ing this (defended by C. Diamond and J. Conant),14 which takes nonsense 
to mean nothing but plain nonsense, but one that engages us – one that 
shows us the limits of sense and cures us from our need for metaphys-
ics.15 Also, in P. M. S. Hacker’s far less radical and in many ways different 
interpretation, we find the idea of nonsense as something with a thera-
peutic potential.16 What I am suggesting is also a therapeutic reading, 
but a reading that approaches the issue differently than these authors. I 
suggest that we understand the issue of nonsense through his late work, 
especially On Certainty. Although there are major differences between 
Wittgenstein’s early and later thoughts, I think there are good reasons 
for taking up such an approach. Firstly, there are interesting parallels be-
tween the way in which he addresses the scaffolding of our thoughts in On 
Certainty and the idea of the scaffolding of the world found in Tractatus 
6.124. In On Certainty, this scaffolding is the non-propositional basis of 
thought, which – construed as propositions – is deemed to be nonsensi-
cal. Such scaffolding does not have a contrast and is falsifiable.17 Also, as 
G. E. Moore explained, we cannot imagine it not being true, wherefore it 
can be said to have “no sense.”18 In this regard, Tractarian sentences elu-
cidate the conditions of sense, describe the scaffolding of the world and 
must therefore remain nonsensical. Writing, thinking or understanding 
propositions about this basic level of being must always already presup-
pose the scaffolding, the fundamental framework of the world, within 
which observations regarding entities can intelligibly be stated, which 
it aims to explain. 
It is on such grounds that Wittgenstein maintains that ethics and 
aesthetics have been misunderstood throughout the history of western 
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philosophical thought.19 The pictorial form of language depicts and 
presents the structure of the world in its form, representing the con-
figuration of things by being connected to the thing through “feelers.”20 
This is exactly what ethical and aesthetical value statements lack; the 
absence of referents in the world makes them stand outside the realm of 
what I might call propositionality.21 They cannot generate truth or false-
hood, since truth or falsehood would only emerge between the world 
and its picture.22 So for Wittgenstein, the philosophical misapprehen-
sion of ethics and aesthetics derives from such a referentiality-mistake. 
The construction of meaning through referentiality is not applicable to 
these realms, since they lie outside of the space of referential language. 
This begs a somewhat provocative question: why then engage in deal-
ing ethical and aesthetical stands, which Wittgenstein clearly does? Here, 
I think the key term is again nonsense. Nonsense is, as we have seen, not 
necessarily a pejorative term. As Wittgenstein says in Culture and Value, 
“… don’t for heaven’s sake, be afraid of talking nonsense! But you must 
pay attention to your nonsense.”23 Curiously, for Wittgenstein, men have 
attempted an intentional transgression of linguistic boundaries to reflect 
on the meaning of life and values. This is an “… absolutely hopeless …” 
attempt, “… running against the walls of our cage …”24 This attempt is a 
document of a tendency in the human mind: “My whole tendency and I 
believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or 
Religion was to turn against the boundaries of language.”25 It is a mani-
festation of a tendency, which Wittgenstein “… personally cannot help 
respecting …”26 as an essential part of being human. Even though ethical 
and aesthetical value cannot be expressed, it “shows itself” through lan-
guage, exceeding propositional sentences.27 So this does not mean that 
the attempt to express what cannot be said must be abandoned.28 The 
showing of ethical and aesthetical value depends on this and on the way 
we attempt the transgression.29 In this optic, nonsensicality is not a defi-
cit, but the ‘very essence’ of ethical and aesthetical expressions. Despite 
logical problems with the intellectual justification of such attempts, they 
seek out something valuable, which may show itself.30 This sheds light 
on why Wittgenstein stated that what shows itself is the most important 
question for philosophy31 and on the concluding remarks of Tractatus, 
where Wittgenstein declares that “…anyone who understands me event-
ually recognizes [the propositions of the Tractatus] as nonsense.”32 
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Interdependence, not identity
Having established aesthetics and ethics as parts of our constitutive 
frameworks that allow us to understand the world, we must now clar-
ify the internal relationship between them. At first sight, Wittgenstein 
seems to maintain the identity of these nonsensical expressions, which 
sounds rather implausible, since it assumes a perfect unity of different 
realms and the homogeneity of both fields by themselves. Approaching 
the phenomena of modern art through claims of unity between the Good 
and the Beautiful – an enduring theme in the history of western Philos-
ophy – would seem hopelessly old-fashioned. I think there is a solid basis 
in Wittgenstein to do away with this strong notion of oneness or identity 
and to understand it in terms of interdependence. 
The fact that Wittgenstein’s ambiguous dictum has often been inter-
preted as stating an ontological identity leads us back to two factors. One 
is the imprecise translation of Wittgenstein’s dictum Ethik und Ästhetik 
sind Eins to Ethics and Aesthetics are one and the same.33 Another is that 
Wittgenstein never specifies what he means by the predicate noun one. 
In his later Lecture on Ethics,34 he highlights some particular differences 
between ethics and aesthetics. Although he somewhat traditionally 
states that ethics is the “…enquiry into the meaning of life, or onto what 
makes life worth living, or onto the right way of living,”35 Wittgenstein 
defines his conception of ethics in a wider sense – a sense which includes 
“… what I believe to be the most essential part of what is generally called 
Aesthetics.”36 Considering these passages, it seems clear that the dictum, 
far from claiming a complete identity of both realms, only signifies some 
kind of unity and interdependence. Most importantly, the interdepen-
dence means that the two realms only can be considered individually in 
their complex unity.37 
The world as a whole – sub specie aeternitatis 
After emphasizing mutual dependence, it is in its place to say more 
about the ways in which ethical and aesthetical perspectives provide us 
with a view of the world as a whole. Light may be cast on this issue by 
examining the treatment of this subject in the Notebooks. In a central 
passage, Wittgenstein clarifies the connection using the expression sub 
specie aeternitatis as taken from Spinoza’s ethics. 
The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is 




 The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of 
them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. In such a way that they 
have the whole world as background. Is this it perhaps – in this view the object 
is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time? 
 Each thing modifies the whole logical world, the whole of logical space, so 
to speak.
 (The thought forces itself upon one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis 
is the thing seen together with the whole of logical space.38
So, what is common to both attitudes is that they provide a view sub specie 
aeternitatis39 or from the standpoint of eternity, which allows viewing the 
world as a whole. To see an entity sub specie aeternitatis is to see it as a 
whole, together with the “logical space” that enables it to be seen. While the 
usual, empirical perspective of humans – due to a subjective position in 
the midst of things (within the world) – never attains an overview, the view 
sub specie aeternitatis provides the outside position needed for aesthetical 
and ethical orientation: this is its substance. 
For Wittgenstein, ethical and aesthetical value ‘shows itself’ in this 
perspective. This in turn exceeds propositional language in that it takes 
a view of life as a whole. From this perspective we experience the non-
immanent value that is blocked, while moving in the midst of things. 
From this perspective we experience value that is not immanent in the 
world, since the facts and propositions that represent them all function 
at the same level.40 This perspective permits us to see the world as a con-
tingent, but acceptable whole: it lets the viewer see with a “happy eye,” 
because “… the beautiful is what makes happy.”41 The experience of value 
arises from such wholeness, from the perceived harmony between the in-
dividual and the world.42 This experience of unity “is what ‘being happy’ 
means.”43 Such an experience, in which the world is directly given to us 
as a whole is what Wittgenstein calls mystical, which is confined to that 
part of reality that is not describable, but makes itself manifest.44
Seeing from the viewpoint of eternity is not to perceive the object in 
terms of causality, or in orientation toward a certain end. With this move 
Wittgenstein separates the questions of human value from scientific 
questions.45 The experience of ethical value cannot arise from scientific 
observation (in perceiving the world causally, focusing and measuring 
a particular aspect, attributing a function to the perceived object) but 
emerges from the gaze sub specie aeternitatis. This means that the dis-
tancing gesture of an ethical/aesthetical perspective, the perception of 
things sub specie aeternitatis, makes the attribution of value possible.46 
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So the ethical/aesthetical perspectives are the bases of any kind of scien-
tific observation, without them there could be no causality, because with-
out the distancing perspective, events would not have a beginning and 
end, wherefore they could not be perceived meaningfully.47 The creation 
of meaning supposes these points of view, from where the flow of life 
events appears as a whole. In this manner they are “… a condition of the 
world …”48 and inherent features of the mind. To grasp this, we have to 
bear in mind that Wittgenstein derives his notion from Spinozean eter-
nity. For Spinoza, freedom is closely linked to the mind’s capacity to look 
at itself from an eternal perspective, which is the perspective of God: “The 
mind’s highest good is the knowledge of God.”49 Our mind has necessary 
knowledge of God, insofar as it knows itself and the body under the form 
of eternity.50 Thus, infinity derives not so much from God, but from a spe-
cific activity of the human mind, which is constitutive for human agency. 
In this specifically human activity of adopting the perspective of eternity, 
God reveals or shows himself. Correspondingly, the ethical and aesthet-
ical ‘shows itself’ when taking a view of life as a whole.51 
II. Constitutive frameworks – limited wholeness 
One could object that Wittgenstein’s concept of sub specie aeternitatis 
seems to provide us with a neutral view from nowhere: subjects can de-
tach themselves from an egocentric perspective and adopt a viewpoint of 
the whole. Is this the case? I will answer this objection by elaborating on 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis of perceived wholeness of the world as a limited 
one. The passages in Tractatus 6.45 reveal central aspects of wholeness 
and limitedness:
To view the world sub specie aeterni is to view it as a whole - a limited whole. 
Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical.
 The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as 
a limited whole.
Let us take a closer look at the issue of wholeness, before elaborating 
on how it is limited. I think we obtain a clearer picture if we turn to the 
later Wittgenstein so as to elucidate some of these points. In On Cer-
tainty, Wittgenstein argues that our world-picture is made up of a set 
of empirical hinge propositions that constitute the foundations of our 
language-games: in this sense it is not verifiable, because it serves the 
inherited background against which one distinguishes between true and 
false.52 Hinge propositions are the “scaffolding of our thoughts”53 since 
the whole system of our beliefs depends on our acceptance of them. They 
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can neither be doubted nor justified and we cannot know their truth, 
since their certainty is presupposed in all judging.54 So this background 
of hinge propositions is not a standpoint, but more like a framework 
within which we adopt standpoints. This framework is not in the world 
in the same sense as a collection of objects, rather it is constitutive of the 
world, because coherent experience of the world presupposes it. 
Now our sense of sub specie aeternitatis, the wholeness of the world 
and our lives, arises from within this framework. Within this framework, 
we do not experience the world in a neutral way or as a value-free cogni-
tive process, but always already in an aesthetical and ethical space with 
certain value orientations. Just as the logical scaffolding of the world is a 
priori, ethics and aesthetics are conditions of the world.55 They endow us 
with attitudes toward the world as a whole. For Wittgenstein, ethics and 
aesthetics are not spheres of discourse among others (which would be 
the conventional way of looking at these: as realms). Also, they are not 
the study of areas, but involve our participation, since the aesthetical or 
ethical value we attach to certain entities cannot be separated from the 
place we wish to give them in our lives.56 They do not have a particular 
subject matter – but are attitudes toward the world as a whole “…that 
penetrate(s) any talk or thought.”57 
We now begin to see how Wittgenstein’s ideas connect to recent dis-
cussions and how an actualization of his thoughts can contribute to 
these. Ethics and aesthetics belong to the scaffolding of our world, since 
we always see the world as good/bad, high/low, worthy/unworthy, beauti-
ful/ugly – thus always in a framework that Charles Taylor calls a frame-
work of strong evaluations (which can be aesthetic too, as we shall see 
later).58 In other words, this framework contains sets of evaluative atti-
tudes, which are presupposed in human agency. Within this framework 
a person identifies with possible standpoints on his life as a whole, evalu-
ates options as more or less worthy and thereby “constitutes himself,”59 
as Harry Frankfurt has pointed out. Importantly, such identifications-
with function as a basis for the possibility of emerging options; to put 
it strongly: they have no reason, but rather give reasons.60 So basically, 
if interpreted and actualized in this manner, Wittgenstein’s notion of 
sub specie aeternitatis does not postulate the existence of a neutral view 
from nowhere, rather the opposite: it simply points out that the view 
of the whole is simply a function within our constitutive frameworks, 
which arises out of our identifications-with. This is one way in which the 
notion of the limited can be understood. It is not when we engage in pure 
contemplation that wholeness arises, but out of our being able to identify 
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with standpoints within this framework. In this sense, Wittgenstein’s ac-
count of limited wholeness is reminiscent of Heidegger’s Being and Time, 
which mentions the caring stance that one takes toward one’s own life – 
it both allows for and simultaneously undermines wholeness.61 It seems 
clear that a strong sense of wholeness cannot be achieved while being, 
because there would always be elements lacking in such a conception 
of wholeness. It is within the limited space of caring about our lives 
and identifying-with that our lives achieve unity and wholeness. Only as 
an object of care and engagement can life be shaped as a whole. So, the 
ability to see our lives as a limited whole presupposes the ability to take 
a caring stance toward life. This means that limited wholeness not only 
emerges in contemplation, but needs partly to be actively constituted by 
the subject in question. Of course the notion of limited wholeness also 
reminds us that it is the limitations put upon us by our identifications 
and strong evaluations that allow a wholeness to evolve in the first place. 
As an important consequence, experiencing the boundaries of whole-
ness and the unity of the subject is a part of an ethical orientation and 
not something that should be overcome. 
Languages and forms of identification 
If we dig deeper into the issue of identifications, we see that we – based 
on this interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas – can make an important 
clarification in regard to the difference between ethical and aesthetical 
languages and forms of identification. While Frankfurt is silent about 
the possible languages of identfication, Taylor, in a footnote, contends 
that these languages need not be exclusively ethical, “… they can also be 
aesthetic and of other kinds as well.”62 So where Taylor merely allows for 
the possibility of aesthetical or ethical languages of identification, Witt-
genstein’s account implies a closely intertwined relationship, where they 
are present simultaneously. This is why it would be fruitful and coherent 
for Wittgenstein’s account to work out this distinction between ethical 
and aesthetical identifications. 
In rough terms we could say that, in an ethical perspective, we affirm 
an ethical orientation. We value objects, persons or relations insofar as 
we somehow manage to wholeheartedly identify with them. We often 
refer to this in terms of being a part of something bigger that oneself, 
such that the self disappears (becoming one of the many singularities in 
the wholeness of the world). In this perspective everything is located at 
the same level.63 When seeking an orientation and identification in an 
aesthetical sense, however, (at least in a modern sense of the aesthetic) 
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we tend to focus on the singular narrative structure of our lives. Most 
importantly, in an aesthetical sense, when we wholeheartedly identify, 
we tend to affirm orientations and values when this process of identifica-
tion fails. By this I do not mean the experience of a simple failure of a 
specific identification, but when we experience a boundary of identifica-
tion.64 What does this mean? Simply, it is about recognizing the impossi-
bility of comprehensive identification of a complete enmeshment into 
any perspective. When Wittgenstein discusses the ethical role of aesthet-
ics and tells us that art teaches us to see the world in the right perspec-
tive, then we must take this to mean that it teaches us to wholeheartedly 
identify with an orientation toward life and to affirm the boundary of 
identification and thereby acknowledge some sort of constitutive nega-
tivity. The right perspective on the wholeness of a life is being able both 
to see and acknowledge the contingent parts as a necessary whole and 
the limits of wholeness. The right perspective is at least partly about the 
acknowledgement and affirmation of the lack of a right perspective. So 
an aesthetical stance does not involve specific artistic contents, but a 
way of perceiving – not a kind of intellectual comprehension, involving 
value judgments, but a non-verbal apprehension of the world as a limited 
whole. So for Wittgenstein this form of aesthetical identification gives 
us a special sense of wholeness that is essential to the good life. So the 
good life, or “being in agreement with the world”65 as he puts it, is not 
about recognizing that the world is merely a totality of facts, bereaved 
of value as Tilghman maintains,66 but also the boundaries of such an at-
titude while engaging in our lives. 
In general terms, this means that Wittgenstein does not reduce the 
good to ethical orientations, but emphasizes the aesthetical aspect of 
defining the good (i.e. the narrative unity of life).67 To sum up, within 
the Wittgensteinian framework, although looking from the same eternal 
perspective, the very structures of valuing and evaluating aesthetically 
and ethically appear to differ. However, this difference does not under-
mine, but rather supports Wittgenstein’s theory regarding the unity and 
interdependency of the two realms.
III. Concluding remarks 
This article set out by drawing attention to two aspects. Firstly, that re-
search has only devoted modest attention to Wittgenstein’s conception 
of aesthetics and ethics. Secondly, attention was brought to bear on the 
influential view, which holds that the insights derived from his asser-
tion on the oneness of ethics and aesthetics, should be seen as detached 
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from the framework of Tractatus. Both were found to be unsatisfying, 
and clarification was required in regard to the relationship between 
ethics and aesthetics and especially the role of aesthetics in the ethical 
orientation. I have argued that a special kind of nonsensicality is not a 
deficit, but a central part of ethical and aesthetical expressions and that 
instead of identity we should understand the relationship in terms of 
interdependence, meaning that the two realms only can be considered 
individually in their complex unity. Both attitudes provide a view sub 
specie aeternitatis and thus allow for viewing the world as a whole, but a 
limited whole rather than a neutral view from nowhere. The notion of a 
limited whole also implies that sub specie aeternitatis is not about a spe-
cific standpoint from which wholeness arises, but about identifying-with 
standpoints within our frameworks of intelligibility. It simply arises out 
of strong evaluations that we make against the backdrop of such a consti-
tutive framework of intelligibility. In other words, the view of the whole 
is simply a function within our constitutive frameworks, which arises out 
of our identifications-with. Within the interdependence of the aesthet-
ical and ethical ways of identifying-with, the most important difference 
turned out to be that in an ethical perspective we affirm an ethical orien-
tation, value (objects, persons, relations) so far as we somehow manage 
to wholeheartedly identify with it; while in an aesthetical perspective we 
wholeheartedly seek to identify with an orientation toward life and af-
firm the boundary of identification. Lastly, the ethical role of aesthetics is 
to push us into the right perspective, which is not a real perspective, but 
the acknowledgment that the wholeness of life, which we seek in various 
ethical orientations, depends on our being able to both acknowledge the 
contingent parts of our lives as a necessary whole and acknowledge and 
embrace the limits of wholeness: the fact that wholeness will always be 
lacking. His account does not just come down to the ability of seeing life 
in its narrative unity, adopting a perspective from which the fundamen-
tal openness and contingency of life obtain form and appear as a closed 
and internally necessary whole. Harmony and well-being also depend on 
an acknowledgment of the limitations in any sort of identification. 
This reading, which emphasizes the aesthetical, goes against influen-
tial views, such as Tilghman’s that sought to understand the Tractatus 
in a Kantian fashion.68 Indeed, if we replace sub specie aeternitatis with 
disinterestedness we see strong reminiscences of Kant, who argued that 
the determining grounds of ethical and aesthetical experiences are the 
same in that they transcend our natural interestedness. In such an op-
tic, one could easily understand Wittgenstein urging us to see the world 
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from an eternal perspective; similarly, Moore maintains that viewing 
the world as a limited whole, sub specie aeternitatis is a matter of seeing 
it disinter estedly.69 Wittgenstein would then be one of the philosophers 
that Williams has in mind when he speaks of philosophers who “... re-
peatedly urge one to view the world sub specie aeternitatis.”70 Williams 
has Kantian and utilitarian concepts in mind, which seek to emphasize 
impartial agency abstracted from the questions of who acts. As I have ar-
gued in the course of this article, I do not take this to be the case: limited 
wholeness does not arise from disinterested contemplation, but rather 
oppositely, from active engagement with our lives, from caring and iden-
tifying-with.71 Williams’ account lacks the branch of philosophers who 
also argued for a view from eternity, but with a wholly different, aesthet-
ical agenda. Could Wittgenstein’s account be closer to them? Nietzsche 
for example, argues for another sub specie aeternitatis perspective and 
wants to move to see our lives only through an aesthetical perspective. In 
The Birth of Tragedy, he points out that “…only as an aesthetic phenom-
enon is existence and the world eternally justified.”72 This claim becomes 
stronger in his later work: life is only worth living from an aesthetic 
perspective, because this perspective grants us a “… rest from ourselves 
by looking upon, by looking down upon, ourselves and, from an artistic 
distance, laughing over ourselves or weeping over ourselves.”73 In short, 
Wittgenstein’s emphasis on the interdependence of ethical and aesthet-
ical orientations is in contrast to the Nietzschean perspective. 
Wittgenstein’s account does not inscribe itself in the Kantian or 
Nietzschean discourse: its genuine merit establishes a middle path be-
tween these two views by focusing on the interdependence and internal 
dynamics of aesthetical and ethical orientations. Also, Wittgenstein’s no-
tion of ethics and aesthetics is broad, and also considers the conditions 
under which ethical and aesthetical orientations emerge. In an impor-
tant sense, Wittgenstein’s account remains non-reductive and formal, be-
cause he only defines the basic parameters according to which achieving 
the good presupposes the capability to see the world as a limited whole. 
As he mentions in the Notebooks, there is no such a thing as “… the ob-
jective mark of the happy, harmonious life,”74 meaning that it can only 
be evaluated from the outside in a third person perspective, since the 
limited wholeness arises out of our wholehearted and deeply first person 
engagement with our lives. In a way, this is what the aesthetical attitude 
sub specie aeternitatis shows us. 
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